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Abstract
Learning to use tools to solve a variety of tasks is an innate ability of humans and has been
observed of animals in the wild. However, the underlying mechanisms that are required to learn
to use tools are abstract and widely contested in the literature. In this paper, we study tool use
in the context of reinforcement learning and propose a framework for analyzing generalization
inspired by a classic study of tool using behavior, the trap-tube task. Recently, it has become
common in reinforcement learning to measure generalization performance on a single test set
of environments. We instead propose transfers that produce multiple test sets that are used
to measure specified types of generalization, inspired by abilities demonstrated by animal and
human tool users. The source code to reproduce our experiments is publicly available at https:
//github.com/fomorians/gym_tool_use.
1 Introduction
Tool use is considered a hallmark of animal and human intelligence. Analysis of tool-using behaviors
have unveiled useful information about the cognitive mechanisms of various species. For example,
woodpecker finches on the Galapogos islands are able to use tools through learning by trial and error
[1], while wild bottlenose dolphins appear to use marine sponges as foraging tools [2]. Furthermore,
wild gorillas have been observed using branches to test the depth of water, as an aid in walking
in deep water, and a bridge to cross a patch of swamp [3]. The sophisticated use of tools demand
potentially complex cognitive reasoning abilities [4].
Causal, relational (transitive), analogical, and symbolic reasoning have all been implicated in
the cognitive processes of tool users. Causal reasoning has been linked to the cognitive abilities of
tool using animals and humans [5, 6], though some argue that only humans rely on “higher-order”
causal relations to make sense of the world [7, 8]. They suggest that humans possess a uniquely
systematic, domain-general relational reasoning ability, whereas other animal tool users rely on
domain-specific expectations for problem solving [9]. Symbolic reasoning requires the subject to
represent a symbol (such as a drawing) as an actual object and as something else that the symbol
stands for (dual representation [10]). This quality is naturally acquired by children at a young age,
and may contribute to the generalization of a solution to a wide range of new contexts[11]. To be
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considered a tool user, an animal (or agent) must demonstrate their ability to systematically solve
a variety of reasoning-specific and domain-general tasks.
Learning to use tools to solve a variety of tasks is an innate ability of humans and has been
speculatively observed of animals in the wild. The underlying mechanisms that are required to learn
to use tools are abstract and widely contested in literature. Models of the requirements of tool
usage inspired by animals and humans have been proposed, such as grasping or manipulation in
robots [12, 13, 14, 15, 16], combining hard-coded exploratory behaviors to perform more dynamic
skills [17], and Inductive Logic Programming [18, 19, 20]. More complex models learn to plan future
trajectories to perform saw and cut behaviors [21], grasp and manipulate tools for new tasks [22],
and utilize previously unseen objects from demonstrations and self-supervision through model-free
[23] and model-based control [24, 25, 26]. Tool use generalization is still broadly unsolved and
prior works lack the framework to properly measure it. In this paper, we propose a benchmark
for analyzing tool use and assessing generalization in a discrete environment inspired by a classic
experiment of animal tool using behavior.
We introduce a framework for evaluating the generalization of methods that learn to use tools
in terms of the reinforcement learning (RL) framework [27]. Our contributions are inspired by prior
work studying the generalization of deep RL methods due to their notable ability to learn complex,
highly successful control algorithms. The generalization capabilities of RL algorithms is interesting
due to the lack of supervision given to agents in their training environments and the expectation
that the agent generalizes to possibly unseen environments and tasks. Learning policies that are
sensitive to changes in the environment and can adapt to these variations is an important approach
to improving the generalization ability of RL algorithms. For example, the introduction of different
modes of emulated Atari 2600 games allowed for agents to be trained in one environment while
being evaluated in slightly ones [28]. Systematically sampling the parameters of the dynamics of
an environment measures the ability of RL algorithms to generalize to test environments that are
similar to or different from the training environments [29]. Most similar to our work, attempts at
quantifying generalization have been made by carefully designing a set of procedurally generated
environments that are split into training and testing sets [30].
Our generalization study, inspired by tool use experiments and the complex reasoning abilities
of animals, categorizes generalization into multiple test environments that can be used to evaluate
a particular set of reasoning abilities of learned agents. To introduce our framework, we define a
set of simply represented discrete environments that test the use of a tool to solve domain-general
variations of an interpretation of a classic animal tool use study.
1.1 Tool Use
For the purpose of our study, we present our working definition of tool use and how it relates to our
study of RL. The definition of tool use has evolved over time to account for new observations of animal
tool use as well as to better approximate our intuitive understanding on what it means to use tools.
We use the definition from [31] to frame our study, which can be found in Appendix: Definitions.
The manipulation of an object by the agent and the completion of a task in an environment is an
important objective of RL and is the basis of our study.
2 Methods
We adapt a classic experiment from the study of tool use behavior, called the trap-tube task [5].
Subjects of the trap-tube task are presented with a transparent tube. Within the tube there is a
trap in the center and an object (representing a reward) placed next to the trap and out-of-reach
of the subject. A stick of a fixed length and a diameter smaller than the tube is placed next to the
subject. The stick represents a tool that can be used to push the object away from the trap and
within reach of the subject from outside of the tube.
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Variants of the trap-tube experiment have helped tease apart the cognitive mechanisms involved
in complex tool use. Studies have shown that most chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys and New
Caledonian crows rely on perceptual knowledge to solve the trap-tube task [5, 32]. That is, subjects
that learned to solve the base task continued to avoid the non-functional trap when the tube was
inverted, suggesting that their solutions were informed by the perceptual features of the trap rather
than the understanding of its physical properties. However, a small subset of chimpanzees and crows
demonstrated physical reasoning abilities by solving a modified trap task where the sides of the tube
are blocked and the food can only be pushed down a hole to an exit beneath the tube [33]. In this
setup, subjects require structural knowledge to solve the task because they need to understand the
functional significance of traps and barriers. Finally, a covered version of the trap task, in which
stickers were placed in the same location as the traps and barriers, reveals the subjects’ ability to
use symbolic knowledge. Here, subjects have to reason symbolically by interpreting the stickers as
their respective structures [34].
According to Seed et al., [34] the use of perceptual, structural, and symbolic knowledge requires
progressively deeper levels of abstraction. We stick to this proposition and individually redefine these
requirements as categories of generalization across a variety of reasoning-specific and domain-general
tasks. We use the definitions for the requirements of generalization Seed et al. [34]:
• Perceptual: Generalization across stimuli that share perceptual features.
• Structural: Generalization across stimuli that share abstract, structural features.
• Symbolic: Generalization across stimuli that share abstract, conceptual features.
An agent generalizes to a set of alterations to a ground truth task if it is able to succeed in
both the ground truth and altered tasks. In order to test this interpretation, we introduce a set of
simulated environments that are used to evaluate generalization to alterations of the classic trap-tube
task.
3 Environments
We evaluate the generalization of the behavior of agents in environments given as RL problems
known as Markov decision processes (MDP, [27]). An MDP consists of a set of states S, a set of
actions A, a transition kernel T : S × A → 4S, a reward function R : S × A → R, and an initial
state s0 ∈ S drawn from a distribution P ∈ 4S. An agent interacts with the MDP sequentially: at
each timestep it observes the current state s ∈ S, takes an action a ∈ A, transitions to the next state
s′ drawn from the distribution T (s, a), and receives a reward R(s, a). Additionally, we propose a
state transfer kernel F : S → S ′ to map a set of states of the MDP to another set of states.
Our focus is on clarifying environments represented in a simple form, as gridworlds: a grid of
cells, each occupied by an object with properties. Object properties are represented by a k-tuple:
(o0, o1, . . . , ok) ∈ R. For simplicity, we choose k = 3 and can present the grid as an RGB image:
(o0 = R, o1 = G, o2 = B). All environments use a grid of size 12× 12. At each time-step, the agent
observes the entire grid as the current state s of size 12× 12× 3. An agent occupies one of the cells
at any given time and can move and interact with adjacent objects as defined by the set of grasp
actions AG = {← g, → g, ↑ g, ↓ g} and move actions AM = {← m, → m, ↑ m, ↓ m} that make up
the action set of the environment A = AG ×AM . Each move action changes the agent’s position to
the adjacent cell in the corresponding direction, and grasp actions allow the agent to move with the
tool object given that the agent is adjacent to the tool and the grasp action is in the direction of
the tool.
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Ground Agent Food Tool Tube (Top)
Tube (Bottom)
Trap Exit
(1) Initial state of the percep-
tual trap-tube environment.
Object positions and rota-
tions are randomized and re-
generated each episode.
(2) The agent locates the tool
in the top right of the grid,
and moves it to the left of the
food and exit.
(3) The agent uses the tool
to move the food through the
exit, out of the tube and
within reach of the agent.
Figure 1: States of a perceptual trap-tube environment.
3.1 Trap-Tube Environments
The trap-tube environments test an agent’s ability to control a tool object with the goal of clearing
the agent’s path to a reward object. The reward object is surrounded by two tube barrier objects
positioned opposite of one another, a trap barrier object and an exit object lie directly opposite
of one another and adjacent to the tube barrier objects. The tool is initially located in a random
position within the environment, always in reach of the agent. An agent will be able to move with
the tool in a given direction, if it is adjacent to the tool and if a grasp action is made in the direction
of the tool. The agent is not able to move or pass through a tube, exit, tool, or trap object, while
the reward object is able to pass through the exit object. If the agent reaches the reward object, the
agent is rewarded (r = 1) and the task is successfully completed. The agent is allowed to observe
50 states in sequence of the environment task, ending on failure to complete the task if the reward
object is not reached (r = 0).
To solve a task that requires the use of a tool is, in general, difficult. The trap-tube environments
are customized to test the generalization capability of agents. Alterations are made to the environ-
ment using the previously defined categories of generalization: perceptual (P ), structural (St), and
symbolic (Sy). For the experiments outlined in this paper, we choose a base set of states Sbase such
that P (Sbase ∼ 4F(S)) > 0. This means that Sbase has a non-zero probability of being sampled
from any given transfer, and is used as the set of states for the base MDP.
3.1.1 Perceptual
The ability to perceive an object as a tool, regardless of the shape, position and rotation, along with
surrounding objects, is an innate ability of humans and observed of wild animals. The perceptual
transfer FP samples the position and orientation of the tool, the width, height, and orientation of
the tube, the position of the trap and exit of the tube, the position of the agent, and the position of
the food in the tube. An episode of a perceptual trap-tube environment is shown in Figure 1.
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Ground Agent Food Tool Tube (Top)
Tube (Bottom)
Trap Exit
(1) Initial state of the struc-
tural trap-tube environment.
Object properties are ran-
domized and regenerated each
episode.
(2) The agent locates, suc-
cessfully grasps, and moves
the tool towards the food and
the exit.
(3) The agent uses the tool
to move the food through the
exit, out of the tube and
within reach of the agent.
Figure 2: States of a structural trap-tube environment.
3.1.2 Structural
Sensory signals interpreted by humans and animals are represented by multiple modalities, such
as visual and auditory. The generalization of sensory feature representations is important to solve
tool use tasks; for instance, an agent placed in a dark, color-less room is expected to solve a task
that was originally demonstrated in a well-lit, colorful room. The structural transfer FSt samples
properties of the objects by category, excluding the agent and food (tool, trap, tube, exit, and
ground). We represent the features of the environment as points on the surface of an N -dimensional
spherical manifold. This was chosen to have an internal consistency in the representations to enable
interpolation and to better represent how the real world is structured and represented consistently.
N is chosen to be 3 to form RGB colors for the purposes of rendering, thus the manifold is a sphere,
however other values of N should also work. An episode of a structural trap-tube environment is
shown in Figure 2.
3.1.3 Symbolic
The interpretation that an object can arbitrarily be represented as a tool is an important innovation
and intuition of humans. The generalization of the relationship between the agent, tool, obstacle,
reward objects is important to understanding symbolic reasoning. In the trap-tube task, the symbolic
transfer FSy swaps the structural and perceptual properties of the base tool object with another
object sampled from the set of possible objects: {tool, trap, tube, exit}. A tool will behave the
same, regardless of how it is represented structurally and perceptually, acting as a ”symbol” of the
environment to the agent. An episode of a symbolic trap-tube environment is shown in Figure 3.
4 Experimental Setup
In order to measure the generalization of reinforcement learning algorithms for tool use, agents
must be evaluated on all possible transfer sets F : ({FP }, {FSt}, {FSy}, {FP ,FSt}, {FP ,FSy},
{FSt, FSy},{FP , FSt, FSy}). We outline the following experiments: (1) train agents on the base
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Ground Agent Food Tube (Bottom) Tube (Top)
Tool
Trap Exit
(1) Initial state of the sym-
bolic trap-tube environment.
The base tool object is ran-
domly swapped with another
object, taking on the respec-
tive perceptual and structural
properties of the objects.
(2) The agent locates the tool
represented perceptually and
structurally as the bottom of
the tube. The agent proceeds
to move the tool away from
the direct path to the food.
(3) The agent moves towards
the food. Although the tool is
represented perceptually and
structurally as the bottom of
the tube, it still maintains the
interactions expected of the
tool, such as passing over the
exit object.
Figure 3: States of a symbolic trap-tube environment.
environment and (2) train agents on the transfer set {FP , FSt, FSy}. The goal of each experiment
is to quantify the generalization of learned agents by measuring their success rate on all possible
transfer sets. Experiment (1) challenges learned agents conditioned on a single task sampled from
transfer set {FP , FSt, FSy}. Experiment (2) challenges learned agents to extrapolate reasoning
abilities. Each experiment stresses the priors of learned agents. Successful agents must possess
priors that enable learning to effectively reason perceptually, structurally, and symbolically.
5 Results
We present baseline results with a proximal policy optimization [35] (PPO) agent to use as a point
of comparison for future work. Due to the sparsity of the task, we also include an intrinsic curiosity
module [36] (ICM) to improve exploration. The agent observes the entire environment state and
processes it into an embedding using two 2 × 2 convolutions, followed by two residual blocks and
global spatial pooling to form an observation embedding. The agent’s move and grasp actions from
the previous time step are embedded into 8-dimensional vectors, while the reward from the previous
time step is fed through an 8-unit dense layer to form a reward embedding. These embeddings are
concatenated and fed to a 64-unit dense layer before finally feeding into a GRU [37]. The GRU
output is then used to compute action logits for move and grasp actions, a value prediction, and
forward and inverse model predictions. The value prediction is used as the returns baseline while
the forward and inverse model predictions are used for the ICM auxiliary losses and rewards. The
agent is capable of discovering sparse rewards and learning to use the tool in the base tool use task,
however, it fails to solve the generalization tasks. On both tasks, we train agents on 5 separate trials
with a different random seed on each.
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Figure 4: Example training (left) and evaluation (right) reward curves averaged over the batch
dimension for an agent trained with PPO + ICM.
Algorithm # trials task is solved µ± σ episodes to solve
PPO 0 / 5 -
PPO + ICM 5 / 5 102K ± 60K
Table 1: Number of trials in which the base task is solved, and mean (µ) plus or minus one standard
deviation (σ) episodes required to solve the base task, for PPO with and without ICM.
5.1 Experiment 1
As described in Experimental Setup, Experiment 1 consists of training an agent on the base en-
vironment, and quantifying its performance on all possible transfer sets. We train agents for 250
iterations, with a training batch size of 1024 episodes, or at most 12.8M transitions since episodes
terminate early on successful completion of the task. We consider the task solved if the agent is able
to solve it at least once during the evaluation phase, since its actions are deterministic and the task
remains the same. Results are gathered in Table 1. The agent trained with PPO and ICM is able
to solve the base task on all 5 trials, whereas, without ICM, the agent fails to solve it on any trial in
the allocated time. This is likely due to the sparse nature of the reward in this environment, where
intrinsic curiosity is needed to encourage exploration. Both agents fail to solve any of the transfer
tasks except for when it is sampled such that it is identical to the base task (data not shown).
Figure 4 depicts average training and evaluation rewards from an example training run for an agent
training with PPO and ICM. Since evaluation is deterministic, the policy either completely succeeds
or completely fails to solve the task.
5.2 Experiment 2
For Experiment 2, we train an agent on the transfer set {FP , FSt, FSy}. We use 500 training
iterations, which amounts to at most 25.6M training transitions. Figure 5 plots the percentage of
training and evaluation tasks solved over the course of training for agents trained with PPO + ICM.
Table 2 reports the average percentage of solved tasks over all transfer sets for both PPO and PPO
+ ICM agents at the point in training where the highest overall evaluation is obtained. The PPO
+ ICM agent outperforms the plain PPO agent, again possibly due to sparse rewards in all transfer
environments.
The failure of either agent to completely solve any single transfer set (exhibiting a particular
kind of reasoning) demonstrates the difficulty of the environments for existing RL methods. We
expect that, given enough compute, these environments may be conquered by the agents described
above without modification. However, we hope that this work stimulates research into priors that
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Figure 5: Mean ± 1 standard deviation and maximum training and evaluation performance curves
from training 5 PPO + ICM agents to solve tasks from {FP , FSt, FSy}.
Algorithm {FP } {FSt} {FSy} {FP , FSt} {FP , FSy} {FSt, FSy} {FP , FSt, FSy}
PPO 0% 0% 35.5% ± 10.9% 0% 7% ± 3.6% 19.4% ± 3.2% 4.4% ± 3.2%
PPO + ICM 2% ± 3% 0% 40.2% ± 16.9% 0% 29.7% ± 8.1% 33.1% ± 19.7% 24.4% ± 9%
Table 2: Percentage of tasks solved (mean ± 1 standard deviation over 5 trials) during evaluation
on each of the transfer sets from training on transfer set {FP , FSt, FSy}.
encourage different modes of reasoning that result in improved sample efficiency and structured
exploration.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the gap of research and ideas that exist between the fields of RL and
animal tool use. Although it is not yet evident that there exist methods that provide the prior
reasoning capabilities needed to learn tool using behaviors in general, we provide some insight into
why this may be and the mechanisms that might be required.
6.1 Bridging the gap between RL and tool use
Animals and humans alike use tools to solve otherwise unsolvable problems, or to arrive at more
efficient or safe solutions that are out of reach without certain tools [11]. In the same way, we
conjecture that RL agents could benefit by leveraging tools, for example by extending their reach
with a stick object as in the simulated trap-tube task. Tools effectively modify the effects of an
agent’s actions, and accordingly, when equipped, it affects the degree to which it can control its
environment. There is evidence in humans and monkeys that using tools as an extension of the
body is followed by changes in neural networks that represent body schema [38], likely due to the
change in mechanical and sensory capabilities they afford. Tools that enable better control over the
environment should allow RL agents to discover solutions to problems that take fewer steps, or to
solve problems which, without them, cannot be solved at all.
How RL agents make use of objects in their environment can be characterized in the language
of tool use: What objects can be considered tools? Does the agent employ relational, causal, or
other modes of reasoning to use tools to make tasks easier or solve-able? An agent’s behavior can
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be studied from the perspective of tool use researchers, and can be updated to better match the
learning or exploration behavior exemplified by model organisms. In this way, tool use researchers
may build simulation models of the real-world phenomena that they wish to study, enabling rapid
iteration and intuition building on the mechanisms behind tool use.
We claim that many of the tasks studied in the tool use literature may be cast in the RL
framework, and indeed should be in order to test hypotheses concerning the cognitive processes
underlying tool use. This work takes a step towards realizing this goal by implementing a simulation
of the well-studied trap-tube task. As mentioned above, the variations on the trap-tube task are
well-suited to studying different forms of generalization, all which have real-world counterparts in
human and non-human animal tool use experiments.
6.2 Potential prior reasoning capabilities
Each type of generalization introduced in this paper requires specific characteristics of agent behav-
ior. At present, to develop these characteristics, agents are only sparsely and extrinsically incen-
tivized to learn to solve the tasks presented. We ask the question: What priors are required to solve
tool use in general? The RL framework depends heavily on the reward signal provided to the agent
over time. In the case studied in this paper, the reward signal is sparse and is only seen by the agent
upon successfully completing the task. Without strong behavioral and reasoning priors, agents will
arrive at tool use seemingly at random and are unreasonably expected to generalize from limited
exploratory experience.
For perceptual reasoning abilities, using a convolutional neural network (CNN) may be a strong
prior. A CNN fits the modality presented to the agent (i.e., observations of a grid world) and the
physically local nature of objects, but alone may not enable learning of tool using behaviors due to
the non-local nature of object-object interactions.
A structural reasoning prior may not be as easily understood due to the nature of the feature
space provided. In the structural task, agents must remember the representation of objects in order
to reason about a solution. Take for example the structural representations of the trap and the exit:
since are always parallel to each other and adjacent to the tube, there may be no way to determine,
without interaction, which object the food will pass through. Thus, the agent must remember
which object-object interactions it has explored during each new episode, possibly developing a
causal understanding of the environment.
Symbolic reasoning with tools is much less understood than perceptual and structural reasoning,
but may require similar priors. Agents must learn to discover the identity and proper utilization of
each object and solve the task through changing object-object interactions on each new episode.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we reviewed aspects of tool use from the perspective of several fields of study and
ultimately chose to frame it as a RL problem. With the support of a classic trap-tube experiment
as an example, we presented a framework for analyzing the generalization of RL agents, taking a
step towards understanding the priors required to learn to use tools. Furthermore, we defined two
experimental setups, allowing researchers to define their own hypotheses for understanding tool use
in the form of a RL generalization problem. Finally, we provided baselines using the well-established
proximal policy optimization algorithm to compare against in future work.
We chose to focus on the definition of tool use, omitting many topics related to tool use such
as proto-tool use, meta-tool use and tool manufacture. We briefly outline these for the reader (see
Appendix: Definitions) and leave exploration of the differences between them as they relate to RL
for future work.
9
Acknowledgements
We gratefully thank Danielle Swank for her dedicated mediation in the discussion of the research
process behind this paper. We also thank Ed Costantini and Andrew Wang for their careful review
of and helpful comments on the paper.
References
[1] Sabine Tebbich, Kim Sterelny, and Irmgard Teschke. The tale of the finch: adaptive radia-
tion and behavioural flexibility. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences, 365(1543):1099–1109, April 2010.
[2] M. Krutzen, J. Mann, M. R. Heithaus, R. C. Connor, L. Bejder, and W. B. Sherwin. Cultural
transmission of tool use in bottlenose dolphins. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
102(25):8939–8943, June 2005.
[3] Thomas Breuer, Mireille Ndoundou-Hockemba, and Vicki Fishlock. First observation of tool
use in wild gorillas. PLoS Biology, 3(11):e380, October 2005.
[4] I. Teschke, C. A. F. Wascher, M. F. Scriba, A. M. P. von Bayern, V. Huml, B. Siemers, and
S. Tebbich. Did tool-use evolve with enhanced physical cognitive abilities? Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 368(1630):20120418–20120418, Octo-
ber 2013.
[5] Elisabetta Visalberghi and Luca Limongelli. Lack of comprehension of cause-effect relations in
tool-using capuchin monkeys (cebus apella). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 108(1):15–22,
1994.
[6] Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl, and Stephen Butterfill, editors. Tool Use and Causal
Cognition. Oxford University Press, August 2011.
[7] James E. Reaux and Daniel J. Povinelli. The trap-tube problem. In Folk Physics for Apes,
pages 108–131. Oxford University Press, May 2003.
[8] Daniel J. Povinelli and Derek C. Penn. Through a floppy tool darkly. In Tool Use and Causal
Cognition, pages 69–88. Oxford University Press, August 2011.
[9] Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak, and Daniel J. Povinelli. Darwin’s mistake: Explaining the
discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 31(2):109–
130, April 2008.
[10] Judy S DeLoache, Kevin F. Miller, and Karl S. Rosengren. The credible shrinking room: Very
young children’s performance with symbolic and nonsymbolic relations. Psychological Science,
8(4):308–313, July 1997.
[11] Amanda Seed and Richard Byrne. Animal tool-use. Current Biology, 20(23):R1032–R1039, dec
2010.
[12] Z. Li and S.S. Sastry. Task-oriented optimal grasping by multifingered robot hands. IEEE
Journal on Robotics and Automation, 4(1):32–44, 1988.
[13] K.B. Shimoga. Robot grasp synthesis algorithms: A survey. The International Journal of
Robotics Research, 15(3):230–266, June 1996.
[14] Atsushi Yamashita, Jun Sasaki, Jun Ota, and Tamio Arai. Cooperative manipulation of objects
by multiple mobile robots with tools *. 1998.
10
[15] S.K. Gupta, C.J.J. Paredis, and P.F. Brown. Micro planning for mechanical assembly opera-
tions. In Proceedings. 1998 IEEE ICRA (Cat. No.98CH36146). IEEE.
[16] D. Halperin, J.-C. Latombe, and R. H. Wilson. A general framework for assembly planning:
The motion space approach. Algorithmica, 26(3-4):577–601, March 2000.
[17] A. Stoytchev. Behavior-grounded representation of tool affordances. In Proceedings of the 2005
IEEE ICRA. IEEE.
[18] Solly Brown and Claude Sammut. Tool use and learning in robots. In Encyclopedia of the
Sciences of Learning, pages 3327–3330. Springer US, 2012.
[19] Handy Wicaksono and Claude Sammut. Relational tool use learning by a robot in a real and
simulated world. 2016.
[20] Handy Wicaksono. Towards a relational approach for tool creation by robots. In Proceedings of
the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. International Joint
Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, August 2017.
[21] Ian Lenz, Ross A. Knepper, and Ashutosh Saxena. Deepmpc: Learning deep latent features for
model predictive control. In Robotics: Science and Systems, 2015.
[22] Kuan Fang, Yuke Zhu, Animesh Garg, Andrey Kurenkov, Viraj Mehta, Li Fei-Fei, and Silvio
Savarese. Learning task-oriented grasping for tool manipulation from simulated self-supervision.
CoRR, abs/1806.09266, 2018.
[23] Aravind Rajeswaran, Vikash Kumar, Abhishek Gupta, John Schulman, Emanuel Todorov, and
Sergey Levine. Learning complex dexterous manipulation with deep reinforcement learning and
demonstrations. CoRR, abs/1709.10087, 2017.
[24] Frederik Ebert, Chelsea Finn, Alex X. Lee, and Sergey Levine. Self-supervised visual planning
with temporal skip connections. CoRR, abs/1710.05268, 2017.
[25] Frederik Ebert, Chelsea Finn, Sudeep Dasari, Annie Xie, Alex X. Lee, and Sergey Levine.
Visual foresight: Model-based deep reinforcement learning for vision-based robotic control.
CoRR, abs/1812.00568, 2018.
[26] Annie Xie, Frederik Ebert, Sergey Levine, and Chelsea Finn. Improvisation through physical
understanding: Using novel objects as tools with visual foresight. CoRR, abs/1904.05538, 2019.
[27] Richard S. Sutton and Andrew G. Barto. Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. The MIT
Press, second edition, 2018.
[28] Jesse Farebrother, Marlos C. Machado, and Michael Bowling. Generalization and regularization
in DQN. CoRR, abs/1810.00123, 2018.
[29] Charles Packer, Katelyn Gao, Jernej Kos, Philipp Kra¨henbu¨hl, Vladlen Koltun, and Dawn
Song. Assessing generalization in deep reinforcement learning. CoRR, abs/1810.12282, 2018.
[30] Karl Cobbe, Oleg Klimov, Christopher Hesse, Taehoon Kim, and John Schulman. Quantifying
generalization in reinforcement learning. CoRR, abs/1812.02341, 2018.
[31] Robert St Amant and Thomas E. Horton. Revisiting the definition of animal tool use. Animal
Behaviour, 75(4):1199–1208, apr 2008.
[32] Alex Kacelnik, Jackie Chappell, Ben Kenward, and Alex A. S. Weir. Cognitive adaptations for
tool-related behavior in new caledonian crows. In Comparative CognitionExperimental Explo-
rations of Animal Intelligence, pages 515–528. Oxford University Press, April 2009.
11
[33] Amanda M. Seed, Josep Call, Nathan J. Emery, and Nicola S. Clayton. Chimpanzees solve the
trap problem when the confound of tool-use is removed. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Animal Behavior Processes, 35(1):23–34, 2009.
[34] Amanda Seed, Daniel Hanus, and Josep Call. Causal knowledge in corvids, primates, and
children. In Tool Use and Causal Cognition, pages 89–110. Oxford University Press, August
2011.
[35] John Schulman, Filip Wolski, Prafulla Dhariwal, Alec Radford, and Oleg Klimov. Proximal
policy optimization algorithms. CoRR, abs/1707.06347, 2017.
[36] Deepak Pathak, Pulkit Agrawal, Alexei A. Efros, and Trevor Darrell. Curiosity-driven explo-
ration by self-supervised prediction. CoRR, abs/1705.05363, 2017.
[37] KyungHyun Cho, Bart van Merrienboer, Dzmitry Bahdanau, and Yoshua Bengio. On the
properties of neural machine translation: Encoder-decoder approaches. CoRR, abs/1409.1259,
2014.
[38] Angelo Maravita and Atsushi Iriki. Tools for the body (schema). Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
8(2):79 – 86, 2004.
[39] Hugo Van Lawick and Jane Goodall. Innocent Killers. Houghton Mifflin, 1971.
[40] John Alcock. The evolution of the use of tools by feeding animals. Evolution, 26(3):464–473,
1972.
[41] Benjamin B. Beck. Animal Tool Behavior: The Use and Manufacture of Tools by Animals.
Garland STPM Press, 1980.
[42] Alex H. Taylor, Gavin R. Hunt, Jennifer C. Holzhaider, and Russell D. Gray. Spontaneous
metatool use by new caledonian crows. Current Biology, 17(17):1504–1507, September 2007.
12
A Appendix: Definitions
A.1 Tool Use
Although there are many proposed tool use definitions, in this paper we have decided that the Amant
and Horton [31] definition is most representative of our study. There are other definitions that have
inspired this work; we use the first as the working definition for this paper:
The exertion of control over a freely manipulable external object (the tool) with the goal
of (1) altering the physical properties of another object, substance, surface or medium
(the target, which may be the tool user or another organism) via a dynamic mechanical
interaction, or (2) mediating the flow of information between the tool user and the
environment or other organisms in the environment. - Amant and Horton [31]
The use of an external object as a functional extension of mouth or beak, hand or claw,
in the attainment of an immediate goal. — Lawick and Goodall [39], page 195
Tool-using involves the manipulation of an inanimate object, not internally manufac-
tured, with the effect of improving the animal’s efficiency in altering the form or position
of some separate object. — Alcock [40], page 464
Thus tool use is the external employment of an unattached environmental object to alter
more efficiently the form, position, or condition of another object, another organism, or
the user itself when the user holds or carries the tool during or just prior to use and is
responsible for the proper and effective orientation of the tool. — Beck [41], page 10
A.2 Proto-Tool Use
Proto-tool use is distinguished from ”true” tool use in that the outcome is achieved via
a secondary object or substance, albeit not something defined as a tool. — Amant and
Horton [31]
The distinction between proto-tool use and ”true” tool use is made in behavioral neurophysiology
because animals exhibiting the proto-tool use tend to have smaller brains than ”true” tool users.
A.3 Meta-Tool Use
The ability to use one tool on another. – Taylor et al. [42]
For our purposes, we define meta-tool use as the utilization of a static object in a preparatory
behavior for tool use.
A.4 Tool Manufacture
Tool manufacture involves the fashioning or modification of objects in the environment
to improve their suitability as tools. — Amant and Horton [31]
Tool manufacture is essentially multi-step tool use involving a preparation phase where the tool is
manufactured and an application phase where the tool is applied.
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